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ABSTRACT 
 
On August 9, 2012 the Morpheus 1.5A vehicle crashed shortly after lift off from the Kennedy 
Space Center.   The loss was limited to the vehicle itself which was pre-declared to be a test 
failure and not a mishap.  The Morpheus project is demonstrating advanced technologies for 
in space and planetary surface vehicles including: autonomous flight control, landing site 
hazard identification and safe site selection, relative surface and hazard navigation, 
precision landing, modular reusable flight software, and high performance, non-toxic, 
cryogenic liquid Oxygen and liquid Methane integrated main engine and attitude control 
propulsion system.  A comprehensive failure investigation isolated the fault to the Inertial 
Measurement Unit (IMU) data path to the flight computer.  Several improvements have 
been identified and implemented for the 1.5B and 1.5C vehicles. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
NASA’s strategic goal of extending human activities across the solar system requires an integrated architecture 
to conduct human space exploration missions beyond low earth orbit (LEO). This architecture must include 
advanced, robust in-space transit and landing vehicles capable of supporting a variety of lunar, asteroid and 
planetary missions; automated hazard detection and avoidance technologies that reduce risk to crews, landers and 
precursor robotic payloads; and in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) to support crews during extended stays on 
extraterrestrial surfaces and provide for their safe return to earth. The Advanced Exploration Systems (AES) 
Program portfolio within NASA includes several fast-paced, milestone-driven projects that are developing these 
necessary capabilities and, when integrated with subsystem technologies developed by Science Mission Directorate 
(SMD) investments, can form the basis for a lander development project. Specifically, the Morpheus, Autonomous 
Landing & Hazard Avoidance Technology (ALHAT), and Regolith & Environment Science & Oxygen & Lunar 
Volatiles Extraction (RESOLVE) projects provide the technological foundation for lunar surface demonstration 
missions later in this decade, and for key components of the greater exploration architecture required to move 
humans beyond LEO.  
The Morpheus Project provides an integrated 
vertical test bed (VTB) platform for advancing 
multiple subsystem technologies. While technologies 
offer promise, capabilities offer potential solutions 
for future human exploration beyond LEO. Morpheus 
provides a bridge for evolving these technologies into 
capable systems that can be demonstrated and tested. 
This paper describes the activities of the Morpheus 
Project, ongoing integration with ALHAT through 
FY12-13, and expectations for the future, with the 
goal of developing and demonstrating these human 
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Figure 1 - Morpheus 'Alpha' Vehicle is prepared for 
testing at Kennedy Space Center in August 2012. 
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spaceflight capabilities with robotic missions to the lunar surface.  
The Morpheus Project provides a liquid oxygen (LOX) / liquid methane (LCH4) propelled vehicle that, when 
leveraging subsystem designs developed by other VTBs such as the Marshall Space Flight Center’s (MSFC) Mighty 
Eagle Lander, may be developed into reusable platforms for in-space transit and/or planetary landing for multiple 
missions and payload capacities. Such platforms could directly support robotic missions and would eventually 
mature into capabilities advantageous for manned missions.  
The LOX/methane propulsion system is one of two key technologies that Morpheus is designed to integrate and 
demonstrate. The Morpheus LOX/methane propulsion system can provide a specific impulse during space flight of 
up to 321 seconds; it is clean-burning, non-toxic, and cryogenic, but space-storable. Additionally, for future space 
missions the lox and/or methane could be produced in situ on planetary surfaces, and the oxygen is compatible on-
board with life support systems and power generation. These attributes make LOX/methane an attractive propulsion 
technology for a lander of this scale. 
ALHAT, the primary Morpheus payload, provides the second key technology: autonomous landing and hazard 
avoidance. When landing autonomously on any planetary or other surface, the vehicle must be able to identify a safe 
landing site that is free of large boulders, rocks, craters, or highly sloping surfaces. Morpheus is designed to carry 
ALHAT sensors and software supporting tests that will demonstrate an integrated vehicle capability to perform these 
tasks. 
2. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
The VTB system elements include the flight test vehicle, ground systems, and operations.  
 
A. Vehicle 
Morpheus design and development began in June 2010, primarily by an in-house team at NASA’s Johnson 
Space Center. The current iteration is the Morpheus ‘1.5 Bravo’ vehicle, and system description references the 
current vehicle build.  
Morpheus is a “quad” lander design with four tanks and a single engine. The primary structure consists of 
welded aluminum box beams, machined parts, and aluminum plate. The landing struts have honeycomb crush pads 
in the feet to attenuate landing loads. The propellant tanks are made of welded aluminum hemispheres. The avionics 
and GN&C components are located on a plate that spans the top deck of the primary structure. 
The propulsion system uses an impinging element-type engine design, with liquid oxygen and methane as the 
propellants. The engine is film-cooled and operates as a blow-down system producing up to 5000 lbf of thrust. Two 
orthogonal electromechanical actuators (EMAs) gimbal the engine to provide thrust vector control of lateral 
translation and pitch and yaw attitudes. LOX/LCH4 pencil thrusters fed from the same propellant tanks provide roll 
control with a redundant set of helium jets that use the pressurized helium in the propellant tanks onboard as a 
backup system. Varying the engine throttle setting provides vertical control of ascent and descent rates.  
The avionics and power subsystems include the flight computer, data recording, instrumentation, 
communications, cameras, and batteries. The flight computer is an AITech S900 CompactPCI board with a 
PowerPC 750 processor. Up to 16 GB of data can be stored on board. Data buses include RS-232, RS-422, Ethernet, 
and MIL-STD-1553. Multiple channels of analog and digital inputs are used for both operational and developmental 
flight instrumentation, including temperature sensors, pressure transducers, tri-axial accelerometers, and strain 
gauges. Wireless communications between ground operators and the vehicle use a spread spectrum frequency band. 
Two on-board cameras provide views of the engine firing during testing. Eight lithium polymer batteries provide 
vehicle power.  
The GN&C sensor suite includes a Javad Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver, an International Space 
Station (ISS) version of Honeywell’s Space Integrated GPS/INS (SIGI), a Systron Donner SDI500 Inertial 
Measurement Unit (IMU), and an Acuity laser altimeter. The vehicle is able to determine position to less than one 
meter, velocity to less than three cm/second, and attitude knowledge within 0.05 degrees. 
The vehicle software is architected around Goddard Space Flight Center’s (GSFC) Core Flight Software (CFS). 
GSFC designed CFS as a set of reusable software modules in a flexible framework that can be adapted to various 
space applications. Morpheus software developers built upon CFS by adding custom application code unique to the 
Morpheus vehicle and mission design. 
The initial Morpheus VTB 1.0 configuration was tested from April 2011 through August 2011. In late 2011 and 
early 2012, the team began upgrading the VTB to the Morpheus 1.5 configuration, including sequentially higher 
performance HD4 and HD5 engines, an improved avionics and power distribution design, the addition of 
LOX/methane thrusters for roll control, and the incorporation of the ALHAT sensors and software. In August 2012, 
the original vehicle was lost in a test crash. The vehicle was rebuilt with over 70 upgrades and is designated as the 
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Morpheus 1.5 ‘Bravo’ vehicle. This vehicle configuration is currently in testing as described in later sections. A 
‘Charlie’ vehicle is also under construction. 
 
B. Ground Systems 
The VTB flight complex (VFC) includes 20’ x 20’ concrete pads located on a section of the JSC antenna range 
near an old Apollo-era antenna tower. About 2000 feet away is the Morpheus control center for on-site field testing 
at JSC, the small 2-story building 18 that was formerly used for rooftop GPS testing and storage. The main upstairs 
room has a window that looks directly out onto the test area, making it highly suitable as the operations “front 
room,” configured with three rows of 
computer tables for operator 
workstations. An adjacent room serves 
as the “back room” for support 
personnel.  
The operator workstations use 
GSFC’s Integrated Test and Operations 
System (ITOS) ground software. Like 
CFS, ITOS was developed as ground 
control and display software for GSFC 
space vehicles and has been made 
available to other projects at NASA. 
ITOS is individually configured on each 
workstation to display vehicle telemetry and information unique to each operator position. 
During each test, the Morpheus Project streams mission telemetry, voice loops, and video from the testing 
control center to JSC’s Mission Control Center (MCC) over dedicated wireless and wired networks. From there, 
data and video can be made available to internal and external networks for NASA personnel and the general public. 
A thrust termination system (TTS) is employed both for range safety and independent test termination purposes. 
Closing either of two motorized valves in the TTS will shut off the flow of liquid oxygen and methane to the engine 
and terminate engine thrust. These TTS valves are completely independent from the rest of the vehicle systems and 
commanded using separate Ultra High Frequency (UHF) radios. The commands to initiate thrust termination are 
sent from a control unit located in the operations center during any live engine testing. 
Ground systems also include propulsion ground support equipment (GSE). The consumables required for an 
engine test include liquid oxygen, liquefied natural gas, helium, liquid nitrogen, and gaseous nitrogen. The power 
GSE is a portable ground power cart that is used to supply power to the vehicle until the test procedures call for a 
switch to internal vehicle power. The ground power cart uses heavy duty batteries and can provide up to 72 amp-
hours of power for pre- and post-test activities. The mechanical GSE includes a rented crane for tethered or hot fire / 
hold-down testing. For tethered tests, an energy absorber is placed between the vehicle and the crane boom arm. The 
energy absorber is an aluminum piston and cylinder with cardboard honeycomb material that can attenuate up to 
10,000 lb. This load attenuation protects the vehicle and crane structures in the event engine thrust needs to be 
terminated prematurely, causing the vehicle to drop to the end of the tether. 
Ground systems also include a variety of transportation assets, provided primarily by JSC Center Operations.  
 
C. Operations 
The final element of the Morpheus system is Operations. Nine primary operator positions are staffed by team 
members: test conductor (TC), operator (OPS), propulsion (PROP), avionics, power and software (APS), guidance, 
navigation and control (GNC), ground control (GC), two range safety officers (RSO-1 and RSO-2), and the flight 
manager (FM). During tests with payloads aboard, another position may be included, such as one for ALHAT. Each 
position is certified through 
specific training. 
Certification is also required 
for three pad crew (PAD) 
positions. PAD-1 is the pad crew 
leader, responsible for 
communicating directly with the 
test conductor during operations 
and ensuring each procedural step 
is executed at the pad. PAD-2 and 
 
Figure 3 – Typical Morpheus ground support equipment 
 
Figure 4 – Morpheus Control Center 
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PAD-3 provide support to PAD-1, and conduct all handling of cryogenic fluids and most other consumables.  
On test days, many other JSC and Morpheus team personnel serve in various functions. JSC riggers support 
vehicle transportation and crane operations. Support personnel for each subsystem monitor data or help out during 
testing in the “back room” of the control center. Other team members stand by for potential troubleshooting if 
problems arise. 
 
3. MORPHEUS TEST CAMPAIGN  
Morpheus testing includes three major types of 
integrated tests: hot-fire, tether, and free-flight.  
 
A. Hot-fire Testing 
During hot-fire testing the vehicle is completely 
restrained from movement and the primary focus is to test 
the LOX/methane propulsion system. In this 
configuration a crane is used to suspend the vehicle above 
the ground to provide clearance for the vehicle exhaust 
plume. The vehicle is also constrained from below using 
straps anchored to the ground that prevent vertical and 
lateral vehicle motion.  
Figure 5 shows the vehicle during test in the hot-fire 
configuration. The vehicle is suspended approximately 20’ 
above a concrete pad by a crane outfitted with shielding to 
prevent damage from flames or debris during the test firing. 
Additional restraints are attached below the vehicle made of 
nylon overwrapped with fireproof insulation or chains.  
The objectives for hot-fire tests include demonstration 
of the igniter, engine ignition, performance at varied throttle 
settings and burn duration tests. The Morpheus project test 
approach limits testing on a dedicated engine test stand and 
emphasizes a quick transition to integrated vehicle tests. 
Testing on the vehicle promotes optimization of engine 
performance for the actual vehicle propulsion feed system 
instead of the test stand system. It also allows gimbal 
sweeps to evaluate the integrated performance of the 
actuators under load. The majority of engine characterization is conducted on 
the vehicle, essentially making the hot-fire configuration the primary engine 
test stand for the Morpheus Project. 
A second hot-fire configuration was also developed to test the thermal and 
vibroacoustic environments at liftoff. In this case, the vehicle remains static on 
the ground, chained to the launch pad. The engine is run for only a few seconds 
at maximum thrust to envelope any environments expected on an actual launch 
attempt. One such test of the ‘Bravo’ vehicle over a flame trench is depicted in 
Figure 6.  
 
B. Tether Testing 
For tether tests the vehicle is suspended from a crane as shown in Figure 4 
to enable testing of the propulsion and integrated GN&C without the risk of a 
vehicle departure or crash. The goal of these tests is typically to ascend 5 to 15 
feet vertically and up to 10 feet laterally and hover in place for a pre-
programmed duration. Upon successful completion of the hover, the vehicle 
descends and “lands” at the end of the tether.  
Due to the potential dynamic loads during tethered flight, a substantially 
larger 120-ton crane is used for this testing. An energy absorber in line with the 
 
Figure 5 – Morpheus in standard Hot-fire Test 
Configuration 
 
Figure 6 – Morpheus in Ground Hot-fire Test 
Configuration 
 
Figure 7 – Morpheus 1.5 
‘Bravo’ executing a Tether 
Test in July 2013 
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tether reduces the loads on both the crane and Morpheus vehicle and helps prevent damage to either asset.  
Tether testing provides the first opportunity to perform integrated testing of the Morpheus vehicle with closed-
loop GN&C. The primary objective of tether testing is to demonstrate 6 degree-of-freedom (DOF) GN&C for 
vertical translation, hover and simulated landing operations. An additional objective is to understand and rapidly 
refine the integrated performance of avionics, propulsion, and GN&C without risk of a vehicle crash.  
 
C. Free-Flight Testing 
Morpheus “free-flights” demonstrate the fully integrated flight capability of the vehicle with no restraints. Free-
flight safeguards are automatic on-board aborts, remotely commanded aborts, as well as the redundant and 
independent TTS that can be activated by spotters who visually determine trajectory deviations. A variety of free-
flight trajectories can be flown to incrementally build up to a fully functional Morpheus lander capable of flying 
planetary landing trajectories. 
 
4. MORPHEUS 1.0 TEST 
CAMPAIGN  
During the Morpheus 1.0 test 
campaign, a series of three hot-fire 
tests was conducted to refine 
propulsion system performance. This 
was also the first opportunity to test 
vehicle hardware and software 
together. Due to the fast pace of 
development, these tests were used as 
verification tests for numerous 
software routines. 
The Morpheus team completed 
these three hot-fire tests in 8 days and 
successfully demonstrated all test 
objectives except for handover from 
propulsion to GN&C. The team 
quickly resolved all issues and 
confirmed solutions in subsequent 
tests, gaining valuable vehicle 
operations experience and confidence 
to proceed with tether testing. 
Immediately following the hot-fire tests, five tether tests were conducted between April 25th and June 1st, 2011, 
with the primary objective to demonstrate stable 6-DOF GN&C. The rapid schedule of the first four tests was driven 
by a demonstration flight planned for the JSC Innovation Day event on May 4th. 
The most dramatic tether test in this test campaign was TT2. Immediately upon engine ignition, an H-bridge 
circuit controlling the throttle valve failed fully open (+100% throttle). The vehicle rapidly ascended and an 
asymmetric bungee arrangement caused a pitching moment. When the ignition sequence was complete and control 
was handed over to GN&C, the vehicle was already in an unrecoverable trajectory. To make matters worse, the 
GN&C system contained a 90-degree clocking error in an IMU coordinate frame, preventing it from stabilizing the 
vehicle motion. 
This uncontrolled 
motion continued 
despite on-board 
software and ground 
commands for soft and 
hard abort and engine 
shutdown. These 
primary abort methods 
rely upon shutting the 
throttle valve, which 
was stuck open. After 
 
Figure 9. Morpheus 1.0 Test Summary 
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Figure 8 – Morpheus Tether Test 2 (TT2); and Tether Test 5 (TT5) 
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13 seconds of erratic “tetherball” flight, engine thrust was terminated by manual activation of the wired TTS.  
The team would not have chosen such dynamic test conditions. Yet this “test failure” provided a training 
opportunity for the team to execute a safe abort, and identified key systems issues, enabling the team to improve the 
engine throttle valve design and correct the navigation frame transformation error. No vehicle or property damage 
resulted from this test, and the team turned around the VTB for another test in less than a week. 
The vehicle was better behaved during TT5, successfully completing a full duration run with nominal engine 
shutdown after 42 seconds. Hover performance was improved, producing only a minor wobble with a period of 
approximately 3.2 seconds. The engine performed nominally and reached a steady-state temperature for the first 
time during VTB 1.0 testing. Testing of the 1.0 configuration came to an end when the HD3 engine suffered a burn-
through event during throttle-up for tether test 6. A new engine design iteration, new avionics, GNC, software, and 
other upgrades were incorporated onto the vehicle to form the 1.5A vehicle assembly. 
 
 
5. MORPHEUS 1.5 ‘ALPHA’ TEST CAMPAIGN  
The Morpheus 1.5A test campaign began in February 2012. Three hot fire tests, one ground hot fire and fourteen 
tether tests were performed, accumulating over 870 seconds of runtime on the HD4 engine. The tether tests were 
opportunities for the design team to continue to characterize and improve the interaction between the GN&C and 
propulsion systems. Table 2 lists the test summary for Morpheus 1.5 ‘Alpha’. 
After HF5 confirmed the performance of the new HD4 engine, the team began the assessment of the integrated 
VTB 1.5 performance in tethered hover tests. Notable tests include TT9, which revealed a GN&C algorithm issue 
that caused the vehicle to exceed the altitude constraint, leading to activation of the TTS to abort the test. TT9 
proved the value of the in-line energy absorber and the very robust vehicle construction in preventing damage to 
VTB 1.5 as it dropped to the end of the tether.  
 
As the first test of Morpheus sitting on the launch pad in liftoff configuration, HF6 provided valuable ground 
effects and overpressure data, and revealed that the footpads were insufficiently insulated. This test served as a 
proto-qual test, intended to envelope the environments expected to be experienced during free flight launches. 
Tether tests 10 through 15 demonstrated increasing vehicle controllability and stability with nominal engine 
shutdowns as the team refined GN&C and EMA parameters. With satisfactory vehicle performance, the ALHAT 
suite of sensors was integrated with the vehicle for two tether tests. This initial integration did identify some 
hardware and software timing discrepancies that required continued maturation once the sensors were removed from 
the vehicle. 
With ALHAT integration testing complete, the team prepared for free flight testing by conducting one final 
tether test at JSC, shipping the vehicle to KSC, and then conducting a tether test at KSC’s Shuttle Landing Facility 
(SLF) to verify transportation did not impact vehicle readiness. 
 
Figure 10. Morpheus 1.5 ‘Alpha’ Test Summary 
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6. FREE FLIGHTS 
 
A. Risk Posture 
Heading into free flights at KSC, it was important for the project to maintain a consistent risk posture. The 
vehicle was built from the beginning as a single-string prototype vertical take-off and landing vehicle. That approach 
enabled the project to pursue lean development and make advances in design, testing and operations in a more rapid 
fashion. However, there are inherent risks to the vehicle using this approach. The project put forth significant effort 
in identifying and mitigating single-point failures that could cause loss of vehicle prior to heading to KSC. That 
included substantial subsystem-level testing, all of the tether testing previously described, and system-level 
protoqual testing, such as the ground hotfire test.  
The primary exception to the single-string philosophy included safety systems in subsystems such as pressure 
systems and range safety. Pressure systems have redundant pressure relief components built in. There is also a dual-
redundant thrust termination system (TTS) on board the vehicle that that includes 2 independent valves in the 
propulsion system, either of which can cut engine thrust on command. This exemplifies the project emphasis on 
safety, even in light of accepting additional risk to the test vehicle itself. 
The purpose of the ground hot-fire test was specifically to envelope the environments expected during liftoff of a 
free flight. HotFire 6 did exactly that. The vehicle was outfitted with a variety of instrumentation, including 
accelerometers, microphones and thermocouples, and was chained to the ground launch pad. Upon ignition, the 
engine was throttled up to 100% and remained for 5 seconds to conservatively characterize the environment. Beyond 
this type of testing, there were no standard qualification tests of components due to the prototype nature of the 
vehicle. 
In addition to the actual testing accomplished, it was important to ensure all stakeholders were fully aware of the 
risk posture for free flights. The loss of the Morpheus 1.5A vehicle was pre-declared a test failure and not a mishap 
as long as no personnel were injured or infrastructure was damaged. In this light, the loss of vehicle was considered 
an acceptable risk for the purpose of advancing our understanding of all of the components of integrated vehicle 
performance. 
 
B. Free Flights 1 & 2 
In preparation for the final demonstration flights with ALHAT, a hazard field – replicate of an area of the lunar 
surface – was constructed off the end of the SLF runway as the approach field for the Morpheus free flight testing. 
The initial test campaign at KSC, though, was intended to incrementally expand the flight envelope to demonstrate 
adequate vehicle performance before 
reintegrating the expensive ALHAT 
sensors.  
On August 7, 2012, Free Flight 1 
was aborted just after liftoff due to a 
faulty transient engine burn-through 
indication. The vehicle detected the 
indication and soft-aborted as designed 
– after rising less than a foot off of the 
pad. The erroneous indication was 
readily fixed, as was an issue identified 
with the crushable footpads used for 
impact attenuation on landing. In 24 
hours, personnel at KSC designed and 
developed some thermal protection for 
the footpads to ensure they would last 
through any flight profile. 
 
Figure 9 – Shuttle Landing Facility at KSC: Morpheus Free Flight 1at 
ignition; and Free Flight 2 after it crash landed. 
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Free Flight 2 was 
attempted two days later, on 
August 9. In this test, the 
data from the only active 
IMU was lost 0.6 seconds 
into flight, causing the 
vehicle to lose control and 
crash. The combined 
JSC/KSC team immediately 
executed the pre-rehearsed 
emergency action plan to 
protect personnel and 
property, so damage was 
limited to vehicle hardware. 
The timeline of events 
during takeoff is shown in 
Table 1. 
 
C. Debris Recovery 
At the conclusion of 
emergency response 
activities, with the vehicle 
and all other hardware safed, 
the Morpheus team reassembled into a debris recovery team. Data was secured from the control center and from the 
vehicle where possible, as well as all video sources. The debris field was methodically mapped over two days and all 
debris recovered. A polar grid was established and debris was catalogued and weighed. Nearly all debris was 
contained within a 50m radius. Results of the debris assessment verified that the blast models used by the project to 
establish safe distances for personnel were indeed conservative. This data has been turned over to numerous 
interested parties to help refine various blast models that have been developed.  
The entire vehicle was 
lost, with the exception of a 
handful of parts that were 
recovered. The onboard SD 
card experienced too much 
heat damage for data 
recovery, but the APU 
Solid State Disk Drive data 
and DFI box were 
recovered. Since the engine 
continued to burn on 
impact, cryogenic 
propellants were flowing 
through it. As a result, the 
HD4 engine injector was 
recovered and reusable, and 
has been incorporated into 
the rebuilt engine currently 
powering the ‘Bravo’ 
vehicle.  
 
D. Proximate Cause 
It was evident immediately upon loss of the vehicle that the onboard IMU has stopped communicating with the 
control computer 0.6 seconds after liftoff. A thorough investigation confirmed this diagnosis. All evidence points to 
proper performance of the power and propulsion subsystems, and software performed exactly as designed 
throughout the brief flight. There were no indications of instrumentation loss beyond the IMU data and no evidence 
of structural failure. Winds and weather were benign at the time of flight. 
 
Table 1 – Free Flight 2 Timeline 
 
Figure 10 – Free Flight 2 Debris Map 
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As a result, the proximate cause was isolated to the loss of navigation data, required by the vehicle to maintain 
its navigation state and attitude knowledge. Without that data, the vehicle is flying blind and responding only to its 
last known state and attitude. However, there are several components within the string of navigation data, and 
forensics did not identify with certainty the absolute cause.  
The IMU instrument itself, 1553 bus hardware and couplers, wiring, computer interface, and software are all 
potential components that could have produced the flight signature. Forensic analysis of the recovered Avionics 
Power Unit (APU), which includes the primary computer, identified good continuity in most harnesses even after 
the crash. Such study could not be completed on the other components as they were unrecoverable. 
The investigation into the proximate cause was guided by a thorough fault tree assessment. The results of the 
investigation yielded the probable failure as a hardware component failure outside of the APU most likely as the 
result of high vibroacoustic environments at liftoff. The affect could have been acute or the accumulation of damage 
due to repeated exposure to the vibration environment. 
 
7. FINDINGS AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS  
The engineering investigation described herein was accomplished over three months and incorporated inputs 
from the entire Morpheus team as well as independent expert reviewers. The findings and corrective actions that 
resulted from the investigation are summarized in Table 2. 
 
8. MORPHEUS 1.5 ‘BRAVO’ UPGRADES 
The loss of Morpheus 1.5 ‘Alpha’ resulted in a rebuild effort to return to testing. 70 upgrades were approved for 
incorporation into the ‘Bravo’ vehicle, as well as GSE, operations and test facilities.  Rebuild efforts began in 
earnest in October 2012 with the first integrated hot fire test completed six months later. To date, two hot fire tests, a 
ground hot fire over a newly installed flame trench, and 8 tether tests have been conducted.  
The knowledge gained in testing the ‘Alpha’ vehicle 
significantly improved the performance characterization of 
the ‘Bravo’ vehicle once its testing began. However, there 
were a number of sticking points that needed attention. For 
one, ‘Bravo’ is a 200lb heavier vehicle and its engine 
produces 800lb more thrust than its predecessor. The 
change in mass properties, combined with some plumbing 
changes, led to an unacceptable susceptibility to propellant 
imbalances that caused a number of soft aborts during 
early tether testing. The abort box is a very stringent 4m 
for tether testing, to prevent tether interaction and ensure 
crane protection. Tuning of guidance and control 
parameters eventually overcame the problem, allowing 
tether testing to proceed unhindered. 
Improvements for ‘Bravo’ vehicle operations also 
included significantly enhanced flight simulation 
capabilities. Reliable simulation tools afforded the project 
the opportunity to predict vehicle performance under more 
risky tether flight profiles. Planned testing progressed from 
simple vertical hovers (all that was accomplished with 
1.5A in 2012) to multi-level vertical motion with lateral 
translations of up to 3m. This expanded capability enabled 
the testing of all different versions of gain scheduling 
through all phases of flight, which allowed the project to 
‘test like you fly’ in preparation for future free flights at 
KSC. 
Integration with the ALHAT instruments was repeated with the ‘Bravo’ vehicle during tether testing. Integrated 
performance was significantly improved from 2012, with nearly all discrepancies resolved and demonstrated HDS 
pointing accuracy within 0.15 degrees. Additionally, the project collaborated with the Mars 2020 Program from the 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory by incorporating a plume impingement study using Mars soil simulant during a tethered 
test. A photo taken shortly after ignition is included as Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 10 – Morpheus 1.5 ‘Bravo’ executing a 
translational Tether Test in August 2013. Mars soil 
simulant was deployed on the launch pad to study 
plume impingement for the Mars 2020 program. 
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One final new test is planned before the team moves to KSC to begin free flight campaigns. A Ground Takeoff 
and Landing (GTAL) test, while still constrained via tether, will be conducted at JSC in September 2013. The 
concept is to buy down risk by demonstrating liftoff over a flame trench followed by a nominal translation, descent 
and landing back on the ground. The tether only provides range safety and will minimize any damage if there is a 
problem during the test. This will be the last test planned at JSC before the vehicle is moved back to KSC for testing 
at the SLF. 
 
Table 2. Free Flight 2 Crash Findings and Corrective Actions 
# Probable or Possible Cause 
or Contributor 
Corrective Action 
1 Vibro-acoustic environment 
near ground repeatedly 
exceeding component limits 
and eventually causing 
fatigue failure during FF2 
Reduce vibro-acoustic environment 
a. Vibe isolation for key components (e.g. IMU(s) & 1553 bus) 
• IMU risk: misalignment due to plastic deformation of vibe isolator 
• IMU challenge: attenuate high frequency vibe but not lower FCS 
frequencies 
b. Relocate IMUs away from center of top deck toward primary structure 
c. Flame trench for ground ignitions at JSC and KSC (assuming feasibility) 
• May increase effective launch altitude by roughly a body length, 
reducing launch vibration by up to an order of magnitude 
• Landing vibration becomes stress case, but is roughly half magnitude of 
current launch vibration due to half throttle, and occurs while 
descending near touchdown 
d. Leverage NASA vibro-acoustic expertise to supplement team experience 
2 Non-flight components not 
sufficiently robust to 
environment (1) 
Increase component robustness 
a. Use PA1 SIGI flight unit  
• Designed for high vibration PA1 environment 
• Perhaps more robust than “flight-like” ISS SIGI development unit 
b. Procure higher quality 1553 bus components with greater robustness to 
high vibe environments 
c. Use both channels of 1553 bus 
• 1553 bus will automatically switch between channels A & B as 
necessary, and can report channel usage to CPU 
3 Workmanship QA provided 
insufficient robustness for 
environment (1) 
Improve workmanship quality assurance/control 
a. Crew Chief provides tighter control over vehicle access and components 
b. Wiring/Cabling Subsystem Lead implements best practices (e.g., strain 
relief) and focuses upon quality improvements & assurance 
c. Certified wiring technicians for build, installation and inspections 
4 Production imperfections in 
primary components reduced 
robustness to environment 
Improve system quality and verification 
a. Higher quality components (e.g., connectors, cables) 
b. More verification testing (e.g., SIGI vibe testing, tethered liftoff test) 
5 Accepted single-string IMU 
risk 
Dissimilar, non-colocated backup IMU(s) 
a. Test backup IMU down-mode and soft abort logic 
b. LCC requirement for operational backup IMU(s) 
6 Accepted risk of brief 
exceedance of IMU qual 
limits due to HF6 and FF1 
test experience 
(1) Reduce vibro-acoustic environment for IMUs with flame trench, vibe 
isolation and relocation 
(2a) Use PA1 SIGI flight unit 
7 Accepted risk of lower grade (2a&b) Use PA1 SIGI & procure higher quality 1553 bus components  
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9. CONCLUSIONS 
NASA’s Morpheus Project has developed and tested a prototype planetary lander capable of vertical takeoff and 
landing, designed to serve as a testbed for advanced spacecraft technologies. The ‘Alpha’ version of the Morpheus 
vehicle successfully performed a set of integrated vehicle test flights including hot-fire and tether tests, but was lost 
during the second free flight test at KSC. The test failure investigation identified a proximate cause as the loss of 
navigation data most likely due to excessive vibro-acoustic environments. A number of contributory factors were 
also identified and discussed, with appropriate corrective actions. 
In early FY13, Morpheus rebuilt a ‘Bravo’ vehicle after loss of the ‘Alpha’ vehicle, and made a number of 
upgrades and improvements to the vehicle and ground subsystems, including integration of the Autonomous 
Landing and Hazard Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) Project’s hardware and software components. These 
upgrades will provide improved performance, expanded capabilities, and better robustness for an extended test 
campaign that will culminate in high energy trajectories that simulate a landing approach on a lunar, asteroid or 
planetary surface. The initial test campaign at JSC will be followed by free flights and high energy trajectories at 
KSC. 
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